‘Deepfakes, Epistemic Corruption, and Problems of Safe Belief’
Postgraduate Research Seminars, February, University of Nottingham.
This talk characterises deepfakes – videos generated by machine-learning AI that depict people doing things they never did – as a form of epistemic corruption. More specifically, I argue that deepfakes undermine our capacity to exercise a set of reliabilist intellectual virtues when it comes to gaining knowledge from videos.
‘The Vices of Epistemic Corruption’
Postgraduate Research Seminars, March 2020, University of Nottingham.
In this talk, I outline my research and draw on the two main approaches in character epistemology (motivationalist and consequentialist) to identify how we might construe the nature of epistemic character damage inherent to epistemic corruption.
‘Motivational Approaches to Epistemic Corruption’
Edgington Workshop and Lectures, April 2020, Birkbeck College, University of London. (postponed due to Covid-19 virus)
According to Kidd (2019, 2020), epistemic corruption damages the intellectual character of agents in two ways: 1) by encouraging the development or exercise of intellectual vices or 2) by facilitating the erosion of intellectual virtues present in our intellectual character.
‘Intellectual Character and Adapted Epistemic Preferences
Vice Epistemology, Recent Contributions by Quassim Cassam: XIII Inter-University Workshop on Mind, Art, and Morality, April 2020, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. canecelled due to Covid-19 virus)
‘Institutional Vice and Corrupted Epistemic Ethos’
European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 10), August 20202, Utrecht University (Virtual Conference)
This talk introduces the concept of a corrupted institutional epistemic ethos. Drawing on the 2020 Lessons Learned Review into the UK Home Office in the aftermath of the Windrush scandal, I argue that the Home Office was subjected to a distinctly collective form of epistemic corruption, which worked to encourage and foster the institutional epistemic vices of ignorance and thoughtlessness the review attributed to the department.
‘Collective Character and Epistemic Corruption’
Understanding Value XI, December 2020, University of Sheffield
This talk identifies a distinctly collective or institutional variant of what Ian James Kidd calls ‘epistemic corruption’ (2019, 2020). First, I set out a way of conceiving of a ‘collective’ epistemic character/ethos in terms of epistemic joint commitment (Gilbert, 2002, 1989). Second, I explicate a number of way that agents within a collective can corrupt its epistemic character/ethos, causing the collective to develop epistemic vices.